Popularizing Africanism: The Career of Víctor Ruiz

Albéniz, El Tebib Arrumi by Ribeiro De Meneses, Filipe
Full Terms & Conditions of access and use can be found at
https://www.tandfonline.com/action/journalInformation?journalCode=cjil20
Journal of Iberian and Latin American Studies
ISSN: 1470-1847 (Print) 1469-9524 (Online) Journal homepage: https://www.tandfonline.com/loi/cjil20
Popularizing Africanism: The Career of Víctor Ruiz
Albéniz, El Tebib Arrumi
Filipe Ribeiro de Meneses
To cite this article: Filipe Ribeiro de Meneses (2005) Popularizing Africanism: The Career of Víctor
Ruiz Albéniz, El￿Tebib￿Arrumi , Journal of Iberian and Latin American Studies, 11:1, 39-63, DOI:
10.1080/14701840500127370
To link to this article:  https://doi.org/10.1080/14701840500127370
Published online: 16 Aug 2006.
Submit your article to this journal 
Article views: 48
Popularizing Africanism: The Career
of Vı´ctor Ruiz Albe´niz, El Tebib Arrumi
Filipe Ribeiro de Meneses
The term africanista describes the generation of officers who, alongside Francisco
Franco, participated in the military campaigns to ‘pacify’ Spain’s Moroccan
Protectorate and who entered into a collision course with the Second Republic,
which they eventually overthrew. These officers shared the conservative mindset typical
of the Spanish army, but added to it an urgency that contrasted sharply with the more
tolerant attitude of those stationed on the Spanish mainland. Africanistas distrusted
civilian politicians, believing them incapable of meeting head-on the forces which
allegedly threatened to tear Spain apart: anarchism,Marxism, regionalism, and atheism.
Veterans of an unpopular and savage war that had claimed the lives of so many of their
colleagues, africanistas viewed themselves as a breed apart, misunderstood men who
were not afraid to take unpopular action to save their country. During the monarchy,
africanistas had enjoyed the protection of Alfonso XIII, being thus officially celebrated
as heroes; they regularly published memoirs and accounts of the fighting.1 The
Republican period saw a decline in their fortunes, and few accommodated themselves
for long to the new regime’s institutions, or its view of the army’s role.
From1909 to the outbreak of the SpanishCivilWar therewas a recurring theme in the
writings of all thosewhodealt withMorocco: the fact that the fate of the Protectorate did
not interest Spanish public opinion, becoming a preoccupation only when a military
reversal took place. This article aims to examine the work of one man who devoted his
life to overcoming that situation, using all means available to him to make the Spanish
public appreciate both the intrinsic value of the Moroccan Protectorate and the efforts
of the officers who had fought and died to pacify it, a stance that led him to carry out the
most significant role in the Nationalists’ propaganda machine during the Spanish Civil
War. This self-appointed mission led him on an idiosyncratic political odyssey, from
republican to monarchist, from opponent to supporter of Miguel Primo de Rivera, and
finally to unrivalled fan of Franco.
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Vı´ctor Ruiz Albe´niz (1885–1954) first went to Morocco to serve as a doctor in the
Spanish-owned iron-ore mines at Beni Bu Ifrur, close to the city of Melilla. It was the
attempt to explain the events which led to the 1909 Moroccan campaign that saw him
cutting his teeth as a commentator on African affairs.2 The mines were exploited by a
large and well-connected consortium, the Compan˜ı´a Espan˜ola de Minas del Rif, and
their exploration had been negotiated not only with the moribund Sultanate, but with
the real powerbroker in the northern mountainous province of the Rif—El Rogui,
a pretender to the Moroccan throne.3 Ruiz Albe´niz, according to his own accounts,
had immersed himself in his work in the mine. Among other duties, he dispensed
medicine over a wide area. This led to the adoption of a pseudonym, El Tebib
Arrumi—the Christian Doctor—which he would keep for the rest of his life.
In 1912, El Rif (Estudio de un espan˜ol en el Norte Africano), was published inMadrid.
Ruiz Albe´niz presented his contribution to the debate on Morocco in a modest tone:
Pero el libro es necesario. No e´ste . . . poco documentado, sin estilo, casi sin orden ni
concierto, pero sı´ el que pudiera seguirle, producto de pluma ma´s autorizada. Es
necesario hablar mucho de ese interesante problema de Marruecos; hablar mucho y
sin pasio´n, para encauzar, con la verdad por norma, elemento mucho ma´s
convincente que la predicacio´n sectaria del polı´tico, a esa opinion ayer ignorante y
hoy desorientada; porque la cuestio´n de Marruecos lo es todo, hoy por hoy, para
nosotros; porque de ella depende el porvenir nacional, porque esta´ en sus principios,
pero ya no lejano el dı´a en que el pueblo ha de emitir en momento decisivo para la
patria sus votos sobre el asunto, y no debe de hacerlo sin completo conocimiento de
causa . . . (Ruiz Albe´niz 1912, p. 7)
In the first part of this autobiographical work, Ruiz Albe´niz tried to bring the Rif to life
in order to enthuse his readership, hoping to awaken a national desire for a consistent
intervention in Africa. Descriptions fill Ruiz Albe´niz’s pages: of splendid Moroccan
horsemen in full charge; of the working of the mines; of the miserable treatment of
women; of El Rogui’s hareem; of a Spanish renegade-turned-translator, Hamu´, whose
sole remaining Spanish trait was the devotion to the Virgen del Pilar. The people of the
Rif, Ruiz Albe´niz stated, based on direct experience, were not fanatics; theirs was a
pragmatic version of Islam, in which religious observance was ultimately subordinated
to profit. While ignorant, the Rifis were willing to learn from their betters. War and
pillage were their natural lifestyle, but a remarkable change was being operated among
the miners, who had begun to understand the relationship between work and the
benefits of regular pay. The message was clear: given stability and an enforced peace,
Spain’s civilizing mission in Morocco could bear fruits among the population.4
The second part of the book brought action to the setting so carefully described. The
1909 war and its antecedents were discussed, with authorities in Melilla and Antonio
Maura’s government in Madrid criticized both for failing to see through the local
tribes’ appeals to the faraway Sultan for help against El Rogui (a ploy for international
support) and for backing the pretender’s strongest enemies, notably the Beni Urriaguel
tribe, which created a power vacuum when El Rogui was forced to retreat. The Beni
Urriaguel immediately began to intimidate pro-Spanish tribes, but the government
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again failed to act, choosing instead to reopen the threatened mines (associated by
hostile tribes with the pretender), which in turn led to an attack on the mines on 7 July
1909. This unfortunate event left a number of workers dead and finally provoked an
ill-considered armed response by Spain. In this series of events Ruiz Albe´niz discerned
the search for a pretext for expansion on the part of Maura and General Marina, the
local Spanish commander. Not only did Marina punish the tribes responsible for the
attack, but he went further, engaging in a campaign of conquest. A generalized
rebellion predictably broke out, with Marina and his forces being pushed back into
Melilla. A series of suicidal Spanish attacks had to be carried out in order to retake
strategic positions around the embattled city. Of these, the assault on the Barranco del
Lobo was the worst: on 27 July 1909, over 1000 casualties were suffered for no
territorial gain. The breakout from Melilla was managed only in September of 1909.
Reflecting on the war, Ruiz Albe´niz stated that:
Tal fue´ la guerra del nueve.
¿Gloriosa? ¿Simplemente provechosa? ¿Equivocada?
De todo tuvo a nuestro juicio; pero lo ma´s interesante, lo que como epı´logo de
aquellas jornadas de sangre y dolor queremos nosotros sen˜alar para que nos sirva de
antecedente de lo que ahora ocurre en el Rif, es lo que sigue:
Despue´s de seis meses de campan˜a, de muchos hombres perdidos, de mucho
dinero gastado, y, sobre todo, despue´s de la victoria obtenida, el paı´s siguio´ mirando
con indiferencia, cuando no con aversio´n, las cosas de Marruecos; los polı´ticos no se
preocuparon de hacer el problema asequible al conocimiento popular, y los militares
so´lo vieron en los campos del Rif el tablero de ajedrez en que se podı´an jugar
partidas empen˜adas, que condujeron, o a la muerte, o al ascenso. (Ruiz Albe´niz
1921, p. 150)
Widely seen as a war to save the financial investments of a handful of powerful figures,
the 1909 campaign led to a wave of popular protests that reached their peak in
Barcelona’s ‘Tragic Week’. All those with colonial ambitions for Spain realized that they
would have to do more to convince public opinion of the potential importance of
Morocco.HenceforthRuiz Albe´niz would volunteer his experience every time that there
was a serious crisis in Morocco. In his writings, moreover, he would urge the Spanish
government to take a strong line in Morocco and the Spanish people to elevate
Moroccan policy to a national concern, one over which there could be no argument.
These were beliefs which, closely modelled on the initial views of Liberal leader (and
investor in Beni Bu Ifrur) A´lvaro y Figueroa de Torres (Count of Romanones),5 would
colour Ruiz Albe´niz’s response to successive governments and regimes. From them he
would never deviate.
Ruiz Albe´niz readily acknowledged that the treaty of 27 November 1912 with France
had left Spain with an inferior share of Morocco. It amounted, in fact, to about 5% of
the country’s territory. Nevertheless, the strategic importance of this zone was, for
him, great, and might yet make it a possession of great value: public opinion had so far
focused on the false question of how much the land in question was worth, when the
real question was to what extent Spain would be affected if someone else controlled it.
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Ruiz Albe´niz also acknowledged the validity of much of the criticism coming from the
Left—including republican circles—regarding the Moroccan enterprise: how could
the most backward country in Europe hope to be a civilizing force? How could Spain
create a modern infrastructure in Morocco, when its own had been created, and was
exploited, by foreigners? How could an illiterate people educate another illiterate
people? How could Spain carry out such an expensive task, especially when the
wounds provoked by the 1898 war were still open? All of this was true, Ruiz Albe´niz
conceded, but Spain was like a gambler who had been losing badly at a casino about to
close, and who had enough money to make one last throw that might yet redress all
previous losses. Spain’s independence was not at stake, but the potential rewards were
great. Emigration to French North Africa might be re-routed to a Spanish possession;
there were magnificent mines to explore; and with a soil similar to that of Andalusia,
northern Morocco might, in the hands of a rival power, emerge as a competitor of
Spanish products, while its ports might put those of the Canaries in the shade and
serve to minimize Spain’s strategic importance.
Spain had won a war and received its part of the Protectorate. What was left to do?
Everything:
En primer lugar orientar a la opinio´n. En segundo te´rmino hacerla ver como se
piensa ma´s en la dominacio´n por la paz que en previsiones de nuevas guerras. Hasta
ahora, Espan˜a solo sabe que hemos mandado al Rif hombres con uniformes y armas,
municiones y dinero para gastos de Guerra. Es ese un sacrificio tanto ma´s molesto
cuanto que el pueblo no quiere, ni debe querer, guerrear. De ahı´ la impopularidad
del problema.
Pues es preciso tornarlo popular, y para ello lo primero que hay que hacer es
orientar nuestra accio´n en A´frica, en el sentido de una decidida polı´tica de paz,
polı´tica atenta a la colonizacio´n por la vı´a civil y a la proteccio´n de la industria, del
comercio, hoy en triste estado. . .. (Ruiz Albe´niz 1912, p. 326)
For the time being the Protectorate should continue to be ruled by the military, but in
such a way as to stimulate civilian activity. In order to do this, good relations must be
established with the indigenous populations, which could be done by stressing that
their innermost convictions, notably their religious faith, were not under threat: ‘¡El
dı´a en que en Melilla se alzase una Mezquita, cua´nta sangre cristiana nos
ahorrarı´amos!’. Once secure in his faith the Rifi, guided by his innate desire for profit,
would associate himself with the actions of the Protectorate:
Me´dicos, ingenieros, maestros de obras, hombres de artes y oficios . . . esos son los
que a estas horas deberı´an recorrer al Rif, llevando allı´ donde llego´ la noticia de la
bravura de nuestros soldados, las pruebas de que Espan˜a es una nacio´n civilizada,
una nacio´n que, como dijo el rifen˜o de la citada ane´cdota, ‘su fusilla, su poder, lo
lleva en la cabeza’. (Ruiz Albe´niz 1912, p. 326)
If El Rif was Ruiz Albe´niz’s response to the 1909 war and the subsequent 1912 treaty,
then 1921’s Espan˜a en el Rif was an immediate answer to the disaster at Annual, when
once again the Spanish public’s attention was turned, due to tragic circumstances, to
the Moroccan Protectorate.6 The heaviest defeat ever suffered by a European army in
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Africa, Annual raised doubts about the future of the Protectorate. Ruiz Albe´niz
struggled to be heard above the debate that immediately broke out in Spain, repeating
his credentials for dealing with a Moroccan topic. He retold his interpretation of the
Protectorate’s history, stressing where Spain had erred. Here we find his standard
description of the people of the Rif, but also of the regenerative powers of the Spanish
presence in Morocco. Mines played an important part in the transformation of the
country, with Western work habits being acquired by otherwise indolent Moroccans.
These were traditional pro-colonialist arguments, as was the description of the
continuing practice of slavery. But the Rif was not static, Ruiz Albe´niz pointed out, and
it presented Spain with a great opportunity. Money was the magical agent that was
going to transform this province, money that its inhabitants fervently worshiped.
To this was added the recognition on the part of the Rifis of the Spaniards’ intellectual
superiority, and therefore their right to rule. However, nine years had now elapsed
since the creation of the Protectorate and little had been done, while the public’s
ignorance of all things Moroccan was still evident and was directly related to the
‘Disaster’.
This wasted opportunity was described closely in chapter VI of Espan˜a en el Rif,
entitled ‘La este´ril actuacio´n de doce an˜os’. The King and his ministers had toured the
newly conquered areas of the Protectorate, but to no avail. No investment was made
and no step was taken that might signal a new turning point in the relationship with
Morocco. This failure to act decisively had played a part in the Annual disaster, but
Ruiz Albe´niz was from the start adamant that General Silvestre, the military
commander in the Rif, also had a decisive share of the blame for his ill-advised manner
when dealing with the tribesmen and their leaders, notably Abdel Krim.7 Silvestre did
not believe in negotiation, in the Moors’ courage, and in their fighting abilities, and,
favoured by the King, had wanted to capture Alhucemas Bay before his superior, High
Commissioner Berenguer, or anyone else. Ruiz Albe´niz put himself unashamedly on
the side of Berenguer as the search for ‘responsibilities’ began. Writing in August 1921,
he could not yet be sure of what had occurred, but invoked his special status as an
authority on Morocco to hazard a guess. He presumed that Berenguer had warned
Silvestre to slow down in a violent discussion aboard the yacht Princesa.8 He also
claimed to benefit from a special source within the army who could not be named, but
who told him that Rifi informers had warned Abdel Krim that there were no
reinforcements in Melilla should Silvestre be cut off. This had emboldened and
increased the Moroccan militia, the harka, whose final attacks proved irresistible and
which for once was not content with booty, driving home its attack in order to cause
the maximum casualties. What followed then was chaotic: officers fleeing to the
French zone, wholesale massacres of surrendering troops, and the very real chance
of Melilla falling to the harka.9 Ruiz Albe´niz found the decision to appoint Maura as
premier inexplicable, given his track record on Moroccan affairs, but nevertheless
urged all Spaniards to rally around their authorities.
Ruiz Albe´niz, like the whole of Spain, engaged in the search for responsibilities for
the ‘Disaster’. His criticism was redolent of Britain’s Union of Democratic Control
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during the First World War, being aimed at the practice of secret diplomacy and at
the unquestioned authority of the military:
No se discute, no se puede discutir ni aun estudiar la polı´tica exterior de Espan˜a.
La diplomacia es sagrada.
No se discute, no se puede discutir, la organizacio´n y actuacio´n del Eje´rcito.
La milicia es infalible.
Y nosotros decimos: organismo que no se discute, miembros de la vida nacional
que no alcanzan jama´s el purificador o´leo de la crı´tica popular, infaliblemente se
adulteran, se tuercen, se malean, se corrompen e inutilizan. (Ruiz Albe´niz 1921,
pp. 249–250)
Still worse was the fact that Spain’s Moroccan policy was all secrecy and no vision.
The government was to blame for Spaniards’ lack of knowledge about Morocco.
Ruiz Albe´niz referred to its failure to use his own services as an example of this
short-sightedness.10 For a long time serving in the Protectorate had been seen as
a punishment in the army, and since the creation of shock troops like the Moroccan
Regulars only the bravest—and not necessarily the best—officers served in the
Protectorate. These men had set the tone for Spain’s dealings with the Moroccans,
since they saw themselves not as colonizers, but as conquerors:
¡Linda manera de pacificar, de proteger, de colonizar! De un lado nos nega´bamos
sistema´ticamente a estudiar el cara´cter, costumbres, psicologı´a, idioma y
organizaciones de los indı´genas. De otra parte, nos encastilla´bamos en nuestras
conquistas, y no nos avenı´amos a dar a los vencidos la sensacio´n de necesaria
fraternidad y espı´ritu pacifista. . .. (Ruiz Albe´niz 1921, p. 261)
The Spanish army’s politicized nature was also responsible for the crisis. Ruiz Albe´niz
attacked the influence of the Juntas de Defensa, established in 1917, claiming that they
were detrimental to discipline and to decision-making, and that they enshrined
duration of service as the sole—and absurd—path to promotion. The action of the
Juntas was reprehensible because it had stopped the flow of officers—good or bad—
who volunteered for duty in the Protectorate, and meant that the central concern of
those who were there was to survive and return to Spain as quickly as possible. This
had paralysed Spanish action in Morocco, with the consequence that the Rifis’
contempt for the Spanish had grown. The Juntas’ effect on discipline was reflected by
the sordid life enjoyed by officers in Morocco, scarred by corruption, gambling, and
prostitution. Soldiers paid for their superiors’ folly. On the day of the disaster, the
army at Annual was missing 200 officers who were not, for a variety of dubious
reasons, at their post.
Despite these obvious failings and injustices, the militarist and anti-democratic
spirit of Spain kept debate, and the search for the truth, at bay. What could be done?
Morocco could not be abandoned, so that its conquest and the punishment of
rebellious tribes remained an imperative. Once this process was over, however, it
would be time to set a new course, with an enthusiastic Spanish public overseeing the
material and moral development of the Protectorate and its people, and with a High
Commissioner answerable directly to a body under the tutelage of the Prime Minister,
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in order for quick reforming action to be undertaken. Democratic politics had to be
reconciled, in other words, with a strong line in the Protectorate. Finally, Spanish and
French action in Morocco should be coordinated in order to achieve maximum
efficiency.
Espan˜a en el Rif was written and published in the immediate aftermath of the
Annual disaster. Las responsabilidades del desastre, which followed it, had the benefit of
an extra year’s revelations and disclosures. Weighing in at 539 pages, Las
responsabilidades had as a prime objective the defence of General Berenguer,
increasingly the target of much public resentment. As before, the defence of Berenguer
was twinned with a criticism of both the action of successive governments and the
imperialist spirit of conquest within part of the Spanish army. Moors, Ruiz Albe´niz
repeated, were not adverse to improvements in their lifestyle; this was verified, he
argued, by the fact that there had been no destruction, in 1921, of the infrastructure
which Spain had built in the Protectorate. Moreover, having collaborated in the defeat
of El Rogui in the Rif, the Spaniards—and especially Silvestre—had deliberately
obstructed the action of another strong man, El Raisuni, in Yebala (the eastern half of
the Protectorate), and had, most recently, insulted and trampled on the reforming
desires of Abdel Krim, leader of the formidable Beni Urriaguel. The choice of an
unknown as Caliph, the highest indigenous authority in the Spanish zone, was another
example of this misguided policy, which served only to turn strongmen, through
whom efficient rule was possible, into enemies.
As far as Ruiz Albe´niz was concerned, the whole of Spain shared in the responsibility
for Annual. Berenguer’s misunderstood policy had to carry out a mix of political and
military objectives, winning over the Rif slowly but steadily by making the Moors
desire the Protectorate rather than seeing it as an imposition. Not only did he have to
fight indigenous resistance, he also had to face the indifference of Madrid, which did
not increase the Protectorate’s budget despite the gradual increase in the area
controlled de facto by Spain. Tribes that had sworn to support Spain waited in vain for
the promised improvements, and eventually despaired of them. Ruiz Albe´niz also had
praise for Berenguer’s immediate collaborators, among whom we find some very
significant military names, and who were described as men of action and not mere
words: Sanjurjo, Vallejo, Serrano, Jordana, and Beigbeder. This was a new development
in Ruiz Albe´niz’s thinking: not all africanistas were necessarily role models, but the
best among them obtained results and concerned themselves genuinely with
the workings of the Protectorate. Confronted by civilian indifference to Moroccan
affairs, Ruiz Albe´niz switched his hopes for a pacification of the Protectorate to these
officers. Silvestre clearly did not fit the bill, advancing as he did across the Rif without
any preparatory work, and it was on Silvestre’s shoulders that Ruiz Albe´niz pinned
the ultimate responsibility for the Annual disaster. Intoxicated by his advance across
the supposedly invincible Beni Said tribe’s territory, Silvestre had grown
contemptuous of the Moors and of those who, like Berenguer, urged caution.
A coterie of supporters had emerged in Melilla to inflate his sense of infallibility.
Silvestre also stood accused of seeing a dissolute lifestyle as an integral part of military
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existence and, in conjunction with the Juntas, of allowing officers in Melilla to fall prey
to alcohol, gambling, and prostitution, which hardly improved their reputation in the
eyes of both the soldiers and the indigenous population. Strategically, Silvestre refused
to heed the many warnings of Berenguer, his superior, and Coronel Morales, head of
the Policı´a Indı´gena and one of the most knowledgeable officers on the subject of the
tribes and their disposition towards Spain. Through his immoderate language and his
clear contempt for the Moors, the increasingly arrogant Silvestre had pushed Morocco
to the brink of rebellion. By exposing his army at Annual he made that rebellion—and
its triumph—a certainty. The result was crushing:
Por triste que sea, hay que reconocer y que proclamar que en Annual y su lı´nea los
espan˜oles e´ramos tantos en nu´mero como los moros enemigos, y aun los
dobla´ramos, y en cuanto a recursos y armamento, aun siendo el nuestro escaso y
deficiente, a nada conduce el sostener que los rebeldes lo tenı´an mejor y ma´s
abundante. (Ruiz Albe´niz 1922b, p. 357)
The only artillery in the harka’s hands had been taken from a captured Spanish
position. The first call for reinforcements was made too late by Silvestre, but still he
advanced no details on the strength of the enemy and wrongly assured the surprised
Berenguer that the tribes between him and Melilla remained loyal. This telegram
caused Berenguer to suspend his own, successful, operations, and to send his best
units—the Foreign Legion and the Moroccan Regulars—to Melilla. Silvestre’s last
hours were marked by indecision and contradictory orders. His lucky star had finally
deserted him, and his constant improvisation finally took its toll. Ruiz Albe´niz’s
veredict was damning:
El que no supo prevenir, ni con tiempo reclamar refuerzos, ni acerto´ a percibir hasta
u´ltima hora lo grave de la situacio´n, y se dejo´ aplanar por la magnitud del desastre, y
no acerto´ a defender las vidas de aque´llos que a e´l estaban confiadas, y so´lo supo
morir, morir como valiente, pero provocando con su muerte la de miles de hombres,
y con ello causando grave dan˜o a la nacio´n, no fue´ Berenguer, fue´ Silvestre, quien,
por lo menos, demostro´ no estar a la altura de las circunstancias. (Ruiz Albe´niz
1922b, pp. 382–383)
By pinning the blame for the disaster on Silvestre, who had died, it seemed, with
bravery, Ruiz Albe´niz was in effect hoping to put an end to the dangerous discussion
on responsibilities which was dividing Spain and distracting it from the more
important task, as he saw it, of conquering the Protectorate and bringing Abdel Krim
to heel. In this he singularly failed and, as is well known, it took the intervention of
Miguel Primo de Rivera to impose an uneasy silence over the issue.
During these years Ruiz Albe´niz also turned his hand to fiction, publishing a novel
and two short stories. Through these works he did more than just use the lure of
the East and exotic customs to attract Spanish readers to the question of Morocco. He
wove into them a running commentary on the nature of the Protectorate’s population
and on the way in which Spain herself was responsible for many of the catastrophes
that befell her there, and which would not have occurred had Spain been properly
governed and united behind the army in its Moroccan efforts. In 1914 a short story,
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‘La carga de Taxdirt’, appeared. It concerned itself with a young Spaniard whose
courage was doubted by all whom he knew. In order to impress his fiance´e, and to
match the achievements of his brother, he had joined the army, but as soon as he
arrived in Africa he began to suffer from dysentery, which prevented him from
fighting. The reputation of being a shirker attached itself to him, and at the same
battle—Taxdirt—both brothers were killed, but while the older brother died a hero’s
death, shot through the heart while defying Moroccan snipers, the main character,
involved in confused hand-to-hand fighting, was shot in the back, so that his
reputation for cowardice was confirmed. The story was told not, however, as an anti-
war tale, but rather as an appeal for selfless devotion to the patria, even at the cost of a
tarnished reputation. That same year another short story was published: ‘Bu Suifa
(Copo de nieve)’. This was a more exotic piece, in which the main characters were
Moroccan with one exception: a Spanish renegade who had escaped from his gaolers in
Melilla and now lived among the tribes of the Rif. The story was divided into two
parts: the first, set in 1901, saw the Spanish renegade winning the trust of a tribal
leader, Fuma, by advising him not to resist the pretensions of El Rogui, and by saving
his daughter, Bu Suifa, from El Rogui’s marauders. The two married as the father
began to reap the rewards of cooperating with El Rogui. The second part of the story
allowed Ruiz Albe´niz to make clear once again his viewpoint regarding Spanish
diplomacy in 1909. Hamu´, the renegade Spaniard (based on a character whomwe have
already encountered), had successfully advised his father-in-law to deal directly with
the Spaniards over the mines, convincing them to withdraw their support from El
Rogui. Hamu´ had not counted, however, on Fuma’s greed and refusal to cooperate
with the Spaniards, which led to war. Hamu´ was now torn between his loyalty to Spain,
whose soldiers he was helping the Moors to fight, and his family, which included a son,
Kadur, raised by his mother to hate all Christians. This was the real nub of the story:
the impossibility of the renegade ever definitively turning his back on Spain. Seeing his
son brought up a Muslim made Hamu´ all the more homesick, and having to wage war
against Spain drove him over the brink. The story ended in apocalyptic fashion, with
Hamu´ shot by his son and his heart ripped out by his wife.
A novel, ¡Kelb rumi! Un espan˜ol cautivo de los rifen˜os, was published in 1922. The
central figure of the novel was a 35-year-old mental patient named Alberto, who had
lost his speech while in the Rif and was now in danger of losing his mind. His sole
words were ‘kelb rumi (Christian dog)’. This character’s diary formed the basis for the
narrative. Alberto had been a doctor in a military outpost in the Rif, and had done his
best to improve relations between Spaniards andMoroccans. He had treated the son of
a local chieftain, who became his friend, and treated as well his older half-sister, Nura,
whose cataracts he successfully removed—this despite the worsening relationship
between the Spaniards and the children’s father, said to be coming under the influence
of Abdel Krim. The friendship of the two youths saved Alberto’s life when, after
Annual, his military camp was stormed by the Rifis, subsequent events mirroring those
that took place at Mount Arruit.11 Of special interest in the novel is the long dialogue
held between two officers in the doomed Spanish camp prior to its destruction, which
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served to inculpate Silvestre for Annual and what followed (Ruiz Albe´niz 1922a,
pp. 80–90). Alberto was taken prisoner and held by the family he had done so much to
help, a family whose women and children now attacked him on sight to the cry of ‘kelb
rumi’. Tried by the tribe, he was saved as a result of his medical skill, and while an elicit
love affair developed with Nura, he was put to work in Abdel Krim’s army, at the head
of a primitive field hospital. Despite his skill, however, he was unable to save his
captor’s life, and his situation deteriorated further after a Spanish plane bombed the
village in which he was being held. Fortunately for Alberto the defunct leader’s
children were still friendly, and planned his escape from the angry villagers. The end of
the novel, like that of the previous story, was brutal: Nura insisted on staying with the
Christian doctor once he had reached safety, but her brother would not allow it,
threatening to kill her, which he eventually did. The doctor, meanwhile, had fled the
bickering siblings, eager to return to the company of Spaniards, but tormented by the
words of the girl who, seeing him run away, had shouted ‘Ah . . . ¡cobarde! ¡Kelb rumi!
¡Kelb rumi!’.
By 1927, Spain’s military occupation of the Protectorate was complete. During the
dictatorship of General Miguel Primo de Rivera the army (largely thanks to French
involvement in the conflict) had been able to occupy all of the territory belonging to
Spain and to disarm the warring tribes. In April 1927 General Sanjurjo issued an order
proclaiming the ‘rebellion’ in the Protectorate to be over. This process had been far
from linear, since the dictator was initially an abandonista, someone who did not think
that Spain had much to gain from the involvement in Morocco. Ruiz Albe´niz’s thanks
to the officers who had eventually accomplished the conquest and pacification of the
Protectorate was immense, and his loyalty to them would never waver. His
commitment to a democratic approach to the problems of Moroccan pacification had
disappeared in the face of the success achieved by the military dictatorship. He was
now concerned with strengthening Spain’s hold over the Protectorate through an
increase in the number of Spaniards working and living there, and through a successful
diplomatic resolution of some pending issues. In 1927, once victory over Abdel Krim
had been secured, Ruiz Albe´niz turned to the question of the international city of
Tangier, whose status was resented in Spain, since it formed a significant enclave in the
small Spanish zone. In Ta´nger y la colaboracio´n franco-espan˜ola en Marruecos (1927),
Ruiz Albe´niz examined Franco-Spanish negotiations taking place in relation to
Tangier’s future, agreeing with the official Spanish line that the city should be placed
under Madrid’s control. This work was dominated by a subject close to the heart of the
africanistas: their selfless devotion to cooperation with France, which had never been
reciprocated. Only General Pe´tain, who commanded the French campaign against
Abdel Krim, escaped criticism. How could France make up for repeated insults
towards the Spanish? By allowing for a Spanish take-over of the city of Tangier, whose
international status made little sense now that the Protectorates were up and running.
Spain’s claim to the city dated back to 1581, and it made little sense for the city’s
supreme authority to be a representative of the French-backed Sultan, and not the
Spanish-backed Caliph, when the city was so obviously in the Spanish zone.
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Ruiz Albe´niz’s last great contribution to the debate on Morocco before the advent of
the Second Republic was his presentation to a Rural Colonisation Congress held in
Algiers, in May 1930, which was subsequently printed and published in Spain. This
work led him to engage in a physical description of the Protectorate and its people, as
well as of Spain’s activity as the Protector nation. Ruiz Albe´niz also detailed land-
holding arrangements in the Protectorate and the consequences of the arrival of
Spanish colonists in the territory. Interestingly, he spoke out against what he called
‘gran colonizacio´n’, the handing out of large swathes of territory to an individual or a
company to develop, drawing a comparison between such attempts and the
latifundiary estates which, ‘por desgracia’, existed in southern Spain, and which ‘no
suelen ser modelos de buena organizacio´n agraria y adecuada exploracio´n’ (Ruiz
Albe´niz 1930, p. 142). He continued in this reformist vein (which no doubt many of
his friends in the Spanish officer corps would have disagreed with):
Triste serı´a que en Marruecos, por cesiones del Majzen a los ‘empresarios de gran
colonizacio´n’, se repitiera ese especta´culo doloroso, de las grandes extensiones de
terreno puestas en una sola mano, mano que, con frecuencia, no suele preocuparse
mucho de hacer producir la tierra, creando la obligada y natural riqueza en el paı´s y
entre sus pobladores. (Ruiz Albe´niz 1930, p. 142)
In this work Ruiz Albe´niz returned yet again to his favourite themes: how cooperation
with the strong men of Morocco had worked and how the mines at Beni Bu Ifrur had
provided the first taste, and the benefits, of regular labour for thousands of Moroccans.
The wars that followed had led Spaniards to view the Protectorate as a barren
and hopelessly poor region, which would never reward investment. Faced by
public and private indifference, High Commissioners had done all in their power,
pacifying and developing with scant resources. In this slow task, Annual had been a
painful and bloody parenthesis, the result of both poor harvests exploited politically by
an able leader and the inexplicable rashness of a military commander (Silvestre, who
was unnamed). The process of colonisation was halted, and many colonists killed,
their good work being undone. Spain, however, seemed to have woken up to her
responsibilities, and from 1922 to 1925 much was done to attract Spaniards to the
Protectorate, with the result that once Abdel Krim had been defeated, the action of
the colonists began to be felt immediately. Ruiz Albe´niz then turned to a racial
definition of the Berbers found in the Moroccan zone, seeing in them kinsmen of the
Spaniards, part of the ‘gran raza libio-ibe´rica’ (Ruiz Albe´niz 1930, p. 57), modified by
contact with Eastern elements, and presented a standard description of the inhabitant
of the Protectorate along lines of racial science.12 From this he moved to the
Moroccans’ moral characteristics, and while he stressed their ignorance and other
alleged defects, he denied their fanaticism, adding that Moroccans were willing to learn
and to improve their lives under the supervision of their Protectors.
Ruiz Albe´niz saw the regeneration of the Spanish zone to be possible and easily
achievable, and counted on Spanish colonists to contribute to this task. As he pointed
out, North Africa had become an established destination for Spanish emigrants.
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By 1930, and in the whole of Morocco (notably in the French zone), there lived and
worked 100,000 Spaniards. Spanish administration was well accepted in the
Protectorate, thanks to its respect for Islam and the way justice was administered
through indigenous authorities, whose venality was checked by Spanish overseers. The
Caliph had been made into a national figure in the Protectorate, and was now
respected by his people, as was his chief minister, the Gran Vizir. Meanwhile, a more
progressiveMoroccan elite was being created through Spanish education. Ruiz Albe´niz
ended by expressing the reasons for his continued faith in the future of the Spanish
Protectorate, in a clear demonstration of his new militarism:
Tenemos fe´, porque desde el desembarco de Alhucemas, desde que aquel hombre,
lleno de santa uncio´n patrio´tica, que se llamo´ Miguel Primo de Rivera, rectificando
sus propios errores crasos y perjudiciales, se decidio´ a ocupar todo el paı´s, la polı´tica
de Espan˜a en Marruecos volvio´ a sus verdaderos cauces, a sus naturales
proporciones, dejando de sentirse constantemente influenciada y codiciada por la
polı´tica interna espan˜ola, y quedando reducidos sus te´rminos a los de una empresa
dificultosa, pero no de imposible realizacio´n. (Ruiz Albe´niz 1930, pp. 256–257)
Spanish policy in Morocco had obeyed a single and enlightened will from the moment
that Primo de Rivera had decided to fight. Primo was gone, but his legacy was still in
place, since General Berenguer was leading Spain and General Jordana, whose whole
life had been dedicated to Morocco, was High Commissioner. Working with him were
officers whose careers had been forever changed by the conflict in Africa:
Tenemos fe´, en fin, porque en la gran obra de la colonizacio´n, esta´n empen˜ados
hombres de gran envergadura mental y conocimiento del paı´s protegido, los mismos
que an˜o tras an˜o han vivido las vicisitudes de nuestra actuacio´n en el norte
magrebino, laborando en la guerra como en la paz por el cre´dito y el honor de
Espan˜a, los hombres que se llaman Berenguer, Jordana, Sanjurjo, Saavedra, Goded,
Garcı´a Benı´tez, Milla´n Astray, Franco . . . los que, en fin, constituyeron y constituyen
la envidiable falange de ‘te´cnicos africanistas’, que en el orden militar, como en el
polı´tico y colonizador, demostraron siempre, y seguira´n demostrando, la ma´xima
capacidad, puesta al servicio del ma´ximo afecto y devocio´n a la honrosa misio´n que
Espan˜a se ha impuesto en el Magreb. (Ruiz Albe´niz 1930, p. 257)
With such men at her disposal, Spain could not fail. Through their leadership, and
through the devotion they inspired among theMoroccans, they would turn the Spanish
Protectorate into another Algeria. Under Primo de Rivera’s dictatorship—and, more
precisely, after the dictator’s decision to return to the offensive through the landing at
Alhucemas in 1925—Ruiz Albe´niz became an adept of themilitary’s vision of a solution
for the Moroccan problem.13 It was only among a select group of officers who
understood and knewMorocco and its people that he found interest in the Protectorate.
Ruiz Albe´niz’s testimony flies in the face of recent historical work carried out into
the nature of the Spanish army in Africa (Balfour 2002, pp. 157–164). The idea that
men like Franco and Milla´n Astray entertained any enlightened notions
about the Moroccan people is certainly hard to accept, given their very actions and
writings, but to Ruiz Albe´niz, it seems, interest in Morocco, whatever its motivation
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and nature, was always superior to the prevailing apathy, especially when twinned with
military success.
Ruiz Albe´niz’s support for the army and his distrust of civilian control of the
Protectorate became obvious during the lifetime of the Second Republic. These years
found himworking for the increasingly conservative Madrid newspaper Informaciones.
Under his usual pseudonym,14 Ruiz Albe´niz maintained a steady stream of articles
concerningMorocco. The deteriorating relationship between theRepublic and the army
and the direct attacks made by politicians against some of the more noted africanista
officers led him to criticize violently the new regime and to warn that, as a result of the
distancing of thesemen from active service in the Protectorate, a wave of violence could
break out. The articles written during the Republic can be broken down into a number
of categories. The first was an attempt to keep Spanish readers interested in Moroccan
affairs through a description of life in the Protectorate. These articles included
judgements on the performance of successive High Commissioners as well as
descriptions of political, social, and economic developments in the Spanish zone.
Since the Protectorate slipped in the priorities of Madrid, where domestic reforms were
constantly being debated, Ruiz Albe´niz’s apprehension mounted. This was especially
true in the first period of the Republic’s existence, which led to a deep distaste on Ruiz
Albe´niz’s part for Manuel Azan˜a and those to his Left.15
On 23 April 1931 Ruiz Albe´niz praised the appointment of General Sanjurjo as High
Commissioner for the Protectorate. Thiswas a decision that implied continuity, the lack
ofwhich had been the cause ofmany Spanish disappointments inAfrica. On 5May 1931
Ruiz Albe´niz reported disturbances in Tetua´n, complimenting Sanjurjo on his energetic
response. Ruiz Albe´niz also blamed Moroccans from the French zone and
‘bad Spaniards’ for the turmoil, which was modelled, he claimed, on the intra-Spanish
disturbances that had greeted news of the Republic’s proclamation in Tetua´n.
The warning was clear: in order to keep peace inMorocco, all Spaniards living there had
to preserve their unity. These initial events remained a source of concern for Ruiz
Albe´niz. On 6 May 1931, Sanjurjo’s action now and in the past, when he had
masterminded and carried out the disarmament of the tribes, was again the source of
praise; Ruiz Albe´niz added that it was imperative that the Protectorate be freed from
the presence of communists and other troublemakers, who could break the unity on
which tranquillity depended.16 Finally, on 22 May, Ruiz Albe´niz recognized that there
were nowMoroccan nationalists in Tetua´n. This was not necessarily bad, he added, but
the Spanish government should not place great store by their support for Spanish action
and criticism of the French, since this was born out of political necessity. Cooperation
with France must come first; Spain should not listen to the siren song of Moroccan
nationalists trying to split the Protector nations.17
From here onwards, however, the situation deteriorated. Bad harvests in the
Protectorate posedproblems for Spain, since spending cuts had led to a dryingupof public
works projects (Informaciones, 20 August 1931); Spanish colonists were feeling the effects
of an adverse economic situation, which led them to dismiss their Moroccan workers
(Informaciones, 30 November 1931); there was a renewed call for investment in health
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services in the Protectorate (Informaciones, 21 October 1931); Islamic militants were
emerging as a possible threat to which Spain and France had to respond in a coordinated
fashion (Informaciones, 4. November 1931); and the transition from military to civilian
rule was taking place too quickly, a potentially volatile situation being thus created.
On 9 January 1932 Ruiz Albe´niz renewed his warning. Politics were proving ever more
divisive among Spaniards in Morocco. The result was that Moroccans were taking
advantage of these divisions, as shown in the rise of pan-Islamic currents. The peace of the
Protectorate was at risk. On 2 February 1932 Ruiz Albe´niz returned to this theme. Intrigue
was undermining the work of the administration, which led to a lack of trust among
Moroccans. Moreover, the situation in the Spanish zone was being closely monitored by
theFrench,whowere increasinglyworried.At the endof the followingmonth, on31March
1932, Ruiz Albe´niz commented on a speech on Morocco made by Azan˜a in Parliament.
Glad to see the Prime Minister addressing the Moroccan issue for the first time, Ruiz
Albe´niz nevertheless delivered a strong criticism, arguing that since the state was not
investing enough money in the Protectorate, private enterprise would not believe in its
future, and would therefore stay away. In the summer economic concerns returned to the
fore.On21 July, RuizAlbe´niz pointedout that his earlier warnings about theneed to secure
markets for Moroccan produce had gone unheeded but that now, when, for the first time,
there was a bumper harvest in the Protectorate, there was nowhere to sell the food, so that
there was a new state of emergency. Moroccans, he added, had traded the rifle for the
plough, and they had to be rewarded. On 23 May 1932 the Caliph, Muley Hassan, was
praised for visitingMadrid for the first time, and Informaciones paid great attention to this
visit. In August and September 1933 a long series of articles appeared examining the
historic and diplomatic aspects of Spanish claims on other parts ofMorocco—Rı´o deOro
and Ifni (formerly known as Santa Cruz de Mar Pequen˜a). December 1933 and January
1934 were taken up with a very different theme—the performance of the departing High
Commissioner, JuanMoles, who had just tendered his resignation. Informaciones claimed
that Moles had worked hard, with few means, to overcome the personal politics and
intrigue that had plagued the Protectorate for two years, stating as well that the resignation
should not be accepted. On 15 January Ruiz Albe´niz pointed out that more time would be
lost as yet another High Commissioner was forced to learn the ropes. Two days later he
hinted thatMoles hadbeenundoneby anumberofhidden forces that he couldnotdestroy.
The incomingHighCommissionermust bemade aware of these plots, whichwould affect
his authority and prestige. Ruiz Albe´niz added, mysteriously, thatMoles had accepted this
situation, and by 18 January the turnaround on Moles was complete: during his tenure
there had been scandals aplenty, with low Spanish morale in the Protectorate paraded
before the Moors. The selection of native authorities had also caused much resentment,
with enemies of Spain being rewarded and old friends ignored, all because of personal
politics. The basic mission of the Protectorate had been completely ignored. It is hard,
without detailed studies of the Republic’s Moroccan politics, to assess the claims about
Moles made by Ruiz Albe´niz on this subject, but the latter was certainly engaging in
political chicanery. Moles was a prominent Republican figure, being reappointed
High Commissioner by the Popular Front government in 1936 before going on to serve
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in theCasaresQuiroga cabinet.Moreover, the kindof article inwhichdire predictionswere
made about the future of the Protectorate disappeared from the pages of Informaciones
once Azan˜a fell from power.
A second category of article by Ruiz Albe´niz during this period dealt with the state
of the army in Morocco. It was his view that poor economic conditions were
coinciding with a reduction in Spain’s military presence in the Protectorate, which
could only lead to difficulties in the future. On 6 May 1931, when Ruiz Albe´niz
welcomed the new High Commissioner, Lo´pez Ferrer, to his post, he also reflected on
the worsening relations between the Republic and the army. The recent decree on
promotions on the battlefield would have a devastating effect on Morocco, since the
most knowledgeable officers would be stripped of their current rank, and would have
to be replaced by those ignorant about Morocco. The Republic was thus re-creating
the catastrophic situation of 1921. He returned to this theme on 12 June 1931. The
list of those officers most affected reads like a Who’s Who of Nationalist Spain. Ruiz
Albe´niz’s message was clear: tremendous ingratitude was being displayed to men who
had risked all for their country. The following day he added that there was no reason
to suspect that illegalities and injustices had hitherto been committed in the
promotion process. Annulling promotions would not only be absurd, it would also
be dangerous for Spain and the Protectorate. After a brief hiatus, Ruiz Albe´niz
addressed the continuing army reforms on 1 July 1931. Manuel Azan˜a had amended
the legislation, which now stated that those officers with ‘questionable’ promotions
who wanted to keep their rank and its equivalent pay should retire. For Ruiz Albe´niz,
this measure meant depriving the army of its best elements, and made sense only if
Azan˜a wanted to pull out of Morocco. On 20 August 1931 he claimed that the
military reforms had destroyed the army’s morale; worse still, the military presence
in Morocco was smaller, with units of Moroccan Regulars being disbanded. This left
loyal soldiers without jobs. The importation of arms was a realistic fear, since naval
patrols had been reduced. A poverty-driven rebellion at a time when Spain was
divesting itself of a well-oiled machine capable of keeping the peace was thus being
predicted. According to Ruiz Albe´niz, Spain’s civilizing mission was being abandoned
and the Protectorate, as a result, might just revert to its formerly violent self. In order
to pacify it anew, much more money would have to be spent.18
Commenting, as we have seen, on the speech on Morocco by Manuel Azan˜a, Ruiz
Albe´niz stated that more troops were needed in the Protectorate, adding that the
decision to disband the Foreign Legion was a serious mistake. The prestige of Spain in
the Protectorate demanded that the Legion be preserved. Military concerns would
be expressed continuously. On 29 December 1932, for example, Ruiz Albe´niz claimed
to be worried by the continuing drop in the number of European soldiers in Morocco,
who thus formed a lower proportion of the overall forces. A significant new departure
was made on 31 March 1933, when he quoted Franco’s article, ‘Ruud . . . Balek’,
published in February 1933 in the military review A´frica, which Ruiz Albe´niz had
helped to found. Franco expressed the usual security concerns, and while it is clear that
he had a much more negative view of Islam and Moroccan culture than Ruiz Albe´niz,
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the latter was not willing to enter into an argument with Franco on these points.
Franco was worried, like Ruiz Albe´niz, that Spanish moves were helping their enemies
in Morocco, and that once the right conditions were in place, an ambitious man would
be able to set the Rif alight. The quality of Spanish troops was poor; the Legion had
been cut down to 4000 men from an earlier 8000, and so Spain would have once again
to rely on conscripts, whom he dubbed ‘soldaditos’. Franco also expressed doubts that
the right officers were in the right place. On 4 May 1934 Ruiz Albe´niz returned to a
familiar theme. Recruitment for the Foreign Legion must begin again. The actual
numbers of this vital force were only one half of what existed on paper, and the
situation was becoming critical. The Legion was Spain’s ultimate source of authority
and power in Morocco: it must be cherished and protected.
A third category of articles attempted to remind Spaniards that their involvement
in Morocco was not limited to the Protectorate. In August and September 1933 a
long examination was made of the historic and diplomatic aspects of Spanish
territorial claims over other parts of Morocco, notably Rı´o de Oro and Ifni. Ruiz
Albe´niz returned to this theme on 9 April 1934 after the seizure of the tiny territory
of Ifni. There was fulsome praise for the Lerroux government, which had taken this
step, undoing an embarrassing anomaly for the Spanish government—that of
repeatedly claiming Spanish rights over Ifni but never enforcing them. Ruiz Albe´niz,
while discounting the possibility of mineral wealth in the territory, praised Colonel
Capaz, who led the operation, and who had been driven away from service by
political intrigue two years previously. Two unsigned articles followed, detailing the
operation and Azan˜a’s schemes against Capaz. The last article was extremely violent.
On 18 April a description of Capaz’s seizure of Ifni was made, with great praise again
heaped on Capaz. Ruiz Albe´niz could not resist, however, giving advice: disarmament
of the local population should be the next step. Capaz tended to believe too much in
the Moors’ promises; that was his only fault. Leaving the local population with no
weapons, and indigenous troops with inferior armament only, was the key to
stability. Ruiz Albe´niz’s views on Moroccan high politics were the subject of the next
articles. On 16 May 1934 he argued that Ifni should be run by a delegate of the High
Commissioner in Morocco, and not, as had been said, as a dependency of the Canary
Islands. All the dealings with Moors, including the government of Ceuta and Melilla,
should be concentrated in one pair of hands. In order to avoid damaging splits,
moreover, the need to coordinate action with France remained imperative. This last
point was alluded to once again five days later, with a warning that precise knowledge
of borders was also essential. On 18 July 1934 Ruiz Albe´niz warned that the French
colonial lobby was raising problems regarding the borders of Ifni; Spanish
negotiators had to be strong in order to uphold Spain’s historical claims in the area.
On 19 January 1935 he called for more administrative resources to be made available
to the High Commissioner in order to facilitate his actions, but the question of Ifni
was still paramount in his mind; three days later, again in reference to the question of
Ifni’s borders, he called on Spain to understand the importance of what was at stake
and pointed out that France could not be trusted on the matter. The same arguments
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were sketched out again on 29 January. The borders, not only of Ifni but of the whole
Protectorate, were the subject of a longer article on 22 February 1935.
The fourth category of article, and the one which, in the highly charged atmosphere
of Republican politics, was most significant, dealt exclusively with the state of the
Spanish army as a whole. As we have seen, Ruiz Albe´niz deplored Azan˜a’s attempt to
reform this institution, seeing in it the cause of future revolt and ruin in the
Protectorate. For this reason, Ruiz Albe´niz made clear his support for Gil Robles as
Minister of War, stating that he was sure that under Gil Robles positions of
responsibility would be awarded on the basis of competence, not politics. The first
contacts of Gil Robles and military commanders, Ruiz Albe´niz asserted, had left a good
impression on all concerned; describing Gil Robles’ words, he wrote that:
. . . el ministro hablo´. Hablo´ no para exponer al detalle sus planes de reorganizacio´n,
pero sı´ para subrayar muchas de las manifestaciones de los generales y marcar la
orientacio´n general de sus planes. Y para pedir la colaboracio´n de todos. Esto fue´, sin
duda, lo ma´s destacado y lo que quedo´ ma´s patente. Con la sola premisa, obligada,
de hacerlo con conviccio´n y entusiasmo, de todos fue´ reclamada la colaboracio´n en
bien del Eje´rcito y para resolver sus agudos y hondos problemas, agravados de algu´n
tiempo a esta parte por la desdichada accio´n trituradora de una polı´tica que no
queremos personalizar en nadie, pero que tuvo la desgraciada eficacia de conmover
hasta en lo ma´s ı´ntimo y respetable la organizacio´n y el espı´ritu del Eje´rcito espan˜ol.
(Informaciones, 14 May 1936)
The change for the better was confirmed by the appointment of Franco for the
‘trascendental puesto’ of Chief of the General Staff, a move longed for by the whole of
the army. The praise heaped on Franco in this article was spectacular. His military
record knew no better, but his life away from the field of battle was equally impressive.
One thousand times he had been asked to become involved in politics, but he had
always refused to do so:
Porque ante todo y sobre todo, antes, incluso, que bravı´simo e iluminado caudillo
marcial el general Franco es un hombre de estudio, y, desde hace muchos an˜os, vive
en la asidua labor de conocer y desentran˜ar los problemas militares de guerra y paz
tanto de Espan˜a como del extranjero. (Informaciones, 18 May 1935)
Beginning on 23May 1935, Ruiz Albe´niz called for a number of changes in the life of
the Spanish army: the abrogation of Azan˜a’s law on retirements from the army, which
meant that those who had been retired—for most who had left, according to Ruiz
Albe´niz, had felt forced to do so—should be allowed to return to the ranks; the
reconstitution of Franco’s general military academy (Informaciones, 10 June 1935),
in order to provide officers with a common education, discipline, and morality; a
reform of the reserve officer system (Informaciones, 17 June 1935); and the creation of
military education before national service was carried out, preparing all male children
for military life (Informaciones, 3 July 1935).19 In September a very exhaustive
examination of recent military reforms was carried out, expressing, unsurprisingly,
complete approval. The basic aim of these reforms was to reinforce the military
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potential of the armed forces and increase the number of men capable of bearing
arms effectively without worsening the country’s finances. Attention was being paid
to questions such as the status of volunteers, military instruction and manoeuvres, and
the creation of new units and the reorganization of others.
With the invasion of Ethiopia by Italy there began a new role for Ruiz Albe´niz:
the systematic denigration of the former so as to justify Mussolini’s actions. Justice, the
treatment of women, witchcraft, education, religion, health, slavery, food: all served to
present a picture of a country that did not deserve to exist. This was Ruiz Albe´niz’s last
campaign. On 2 March 1936 his resignation from the paper was announced, as was
that of Informaciones’ director, Juan Pujol. The reason for this move was a decree
published by the Popular Front government ordering the re-hiring of all workers who
had been fired as a result of their participation in the general strike of October 1934.
Ruiz Albe´niz had moved steadily to the Right as a result of his support for the army
and for Spain’s military presence in theMoroccan Protectorate. It comes as no surprise,
therefore, to find him in theNationalist campduring theCivilWar.What does come as a
surprise, however, is the scale of his contribution to the propaganda battle, hitherto
ignored in the historiography of the conflict. He became the principal figure in the
struggle to legitimize the actions of the army and, of course, of Franco. Hemade regular
radio broadcasts and published endless articles in the Nationalist press. These were
collected and published throughout the war. In addition, he wrote a number of popular
biographies of leading military figures and wrote a history of the war, as well as war-
related fiction, for children (Ruiz Albe´niz 1939b, 1940, 1942). His radio addresses, in
sheer numbers, far outweigh the much-better known tirades of General Queipo de
Llano, whose aggressive style was avoided.20 Ruiz Albe´niz’s main concern in this
enormous output was to bring to life the Nationalist war effort by allowing his readers
and listeners access to the mind of not only the commanders, notably Franco himself,
but also of the front-line troops. Among these he had a special predilection for his ‘old
friends’ in the Legion and the Moroccan Regulars, the very units that bore the brunt of
Republican accusations of atrocities and which had thus to be humanized.
Ruiz Albe´niz’s value as a correspondent and a propagandist was made clear in the
prologue to the first volume of his wartime chronicles, El cerco de Madrid, written by
the founder of the Foreign Legion, Milla´n Astray. Milla´n described Ruiz Albe´niz as a
veteran of Morocco, a companion in arms from the very beginning of Spain’s
involvement in the Protectorate, an expert on the territory whose contribution to its
development was unrivalled, and a personal friend of all those officers who had
dedicated their careers to the pacification of Morocco. Milla´n added that
. . . sus cro´nicas, todos los espan˜oles y, sobre todo, todas las mujeres espan˜olas las
conocen y las ansı´an a la hora en que la radio oficial las transmite, como
complemento del Parte Oficial del Cuartel General del Generalı´simo, por gozar
Ruiz Albe´niz del bien ganado privilegio de estar encomendado por el Alto Mando,
en la dedicada y patrio´tica misio´n de comunicar a los espan˜oles el detalle y
la impresio´n veraz de lo que cada dı´a va sucediendo en los frentes de batalla.
(Ruiz Albe´niz 1938a, p. 10)
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Milla´n also referred to the recent loss of Ruiz Albe´niz’s son, a founder of the
Falangist movement who had been killed in Madrid at the outbreak of war. It was to
this son, Alberto, that the first volume of his chronicles was dedicated.
In his wartime biography of Franco, Ruiz Albe´niz presented, as before, the image of
a soldier whose unrivalled success was the result of careful study. This was evident
during his years as a cadet, when he would unerringly predict the successes and failures
of the army in Morocco; it was kept up while in Morocco, so that each campaign
became a triumph thanks to careful preparation. More important, however, was the
divine protection that accompanied Franco, and of which Franco himself was aware.
Wounded in combat, it was believed by his doctors that he would soon die, but ‘entre
la vida y la muerte paro´ el capita´n Franco varias semanas sin que en la tremenda lucha
entablada con la “descarnada” perdiera ni por un momento su proverbial optimismo,
ni su confianza ciega en la proteccio´n Divina, que habı´a de salvar su vida para bien de
Espan˜a’ (Ruiz Albe´niz 1937, p. 11). This belief in his invulnerability led to a number of
reprimands from his superiors, exasperated by Franco’s insistence on riding a white
horse at the head of his troops. Thanks to officers like Franco, Spain was able to
conquer the Protectorate, re-establishing her prestige. Later in life Franco had wanted
to share his experiences with the next generation, proposing the creation of a general
military academy capable of providing moral unity for the whole army. Primo de
Rivera had backed the plan, hoping to see the conquering spirit of the Legion being
preserved. The success of the experiment led to its closure by Republicans as soon as
they were in power, since they were, at heart, enemies of the army. Refusing to be
sucked in by intrigue and petty politics, Franco had responded to this attack by
travelling across Europe, bringing himself up to date on the latest military
developments in order, when called upon, to save the Spanish army. This is what began
to happen once Gil Robles became Minister of War and Franco Chief of the General
Staff, and the reforms carried out had allowed the army to survive the return of the
Popular Front, and of Azan˜a, to power. Exiled to the Canaries, Franco retained his
sense of decorum and obedience—as witnessed by the famous letter to Casares
Quiroga—until he could take no more, rising to save Spain.
In his chronicles, Ruiz Albe´niz presented Franco as the beloved leader of his soldiers
and the veterans of Morocco as the leaders of a Francoist cult. He himself, as an
africanista without rival, also performed this mission, telling soldiers firsthand of
Franco’s feats in Morocco and then recounting the scenes, including the soldiers’
reactions, in his chronicles. Ruiz Albe´niz also expressed the sorrow that Franco, above
all else a soldier, felt over having to take on the role of statesman:
De todos los me´ritos que se conciertan en el Caudillo para merecer la gratitud que le
otorga Espan˜a entera, para mı´ ningu´n tı´tulo como e´ste de haber sabido sacrificar su
temperamento, enderezar su sabidurı´a, frenar sus ı´mpetus y castigar sus aficiones
para mejor servir a la necesidad de la Patria, separa´ndose de sus soldados, del
contacto diario e ı´ntimo con la guerra y olvida´ndose de su deseo de ser so´lo jefe
militar, conductor de tropas, ganador de tierras, cosechador de victorias be´licas. Este
sacrificio nunca se lo pagaremos al Caudillo. (Ruiz Albe´niz 1938d, p. 73)
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This sacrifice was all the greater for the death of five of the six potential leaders of the
movement: Sanjurjo, Primo de Rivera, Calvo Sotelo, Goded and Mola. All of these
men were to have worked together, pooling their efforts to save Spain. With the death
of Mola in 1937, only Franco remained:
Quedo´ Franco so´lo. Franco, Jefe de Estado y de Gobierno, y Hacendista, y Juez
Supremo, y Organizador infatigable de la vida social, industrial, fabril, comercial;
Generalı´simo del Eje´rcito y de la Marina y primera figura del Estado Mayor de
nuestras Fuerzas; Legislador enciclope´dico, Diploma´tico, Jurisperito, Regidor de la
Cultura, Polı´tico avisado y diestro. Son tantas las facetas de su actividad y de sus
talentos en este an˜o, ¡que no cabe ni enumerarlas! (Ruiz Albe´niz 1938c, pp. 24–25)
Ruiz Albe´niz also attempted to link Franco to Jose´ Antonio Primo de Rivera, thus
reinforcing Franco’s supreme political authority within the divided Nationalist camp.
This was done through the medium of a remembered conversation held between Ruiz
Albe´niz and Franco in the Canaries, shortly before the pronunciamiento. Ruiz Albe´niz
was in the Canaries to meet his son Alberto, returning from Spanish Guinea. Both
called to see Franco, who advised Ruiz Albe´niz, and all good Spaniards, to make
themselves known to the Guardia Civil so that, when the time came, they might
supplement its ranks. Franco then asked Ruiz Albe´niz what he made of Jose´ Antonio.
Ruiz Albe´niz’s answer was enthusiastic:
Creo, mi General, que de todo cuanto existe en nuestra Espan˜a de hoy, fuera del
Eje´rcito, el u´nico que merece verdadera atencio´n es Jose´ Antonio. Tiene cualidades
sublimes de excelso patriota, de hombre de mando, de polı´tico honrado, de
socio´logo moderno, despierto. Tiene, sobre todo eso, la gran virtud de saberse hacer,
no ya querer, sino adorar de cuantos le tratan y oyen una sola vez. ¿Te acuerdas, mi
General, del don divino de Milla´n cuando daba espı´ritu a la Legio´n. . .? Pues algo, no
ya como eso, sino quiza´s superior a eso, porque Jose´ Antonio ha operado sobre una
masa tan inerte, tan frı´a, como es la generacio´n de jo´venes espan˜oles de ahora,
frı´volos, adocenados, sin pulso ni ideal siquiera, y ha hecho de ellos, en pocos meses,
una FALANGE con alma y cuerpo, corazo´n y voluntad de titanes, de he´roes. . .
(Ruiz Albe´niz 1938d, p. 106)
Franco listened to this answer smiling, and replied: ‘tengo exactamente la misma
opinio´n que tu´’. He added that the work left unfinished by General Primo de Rivera—
saving Spain—would be finished by his son. In the future, Franco expected, great
reliance would have to be placed on Jose´ Antonio, as a result of which he wanted to
know Primo de Rivera’s thought down to the smallest detail. And, he added, since Ruiz
Albe´niz was going to Lisbon, he might pass on Franco’s thoughts on the subject to
General Sanjurjo. Jose´ Antonio, of course, died in Alicante, but Ruiz Albe´niz wrote of
the dictator’s son and of Franco that ‘eran dos hermanos en el santo Ideal de una
Espan˜a Grande, Honrada, Una y Fuerte. Y con esa comunidad en lo esencial del Credo
no podı´a haber nada esencialmente separador de sus dos inteligencias, sus dos
corazones y sus dos voluntades’ (Ruiz Albe´niz 1938d, pp. 107–108).
In Nationalist war propaganda an attempt was made to portray the Moroccan
Regulares in a positive light. As can be expected Ruiz Albe´niz was at the forefront
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of this effort, asserting that Moroccans fought in Spain because they knew, trusted, and
admired the generals who led them—especially Franco.21 Military service was a
normal form of employment in the Protectorate, and it was with the greatest of ease
that the Regulares crossed the straits of Gibraltar to come and fight alongside their
beloved officers in a cause that concerned them both. Ruiz Albe´niz was able, in his
writing, to humanize the Moors, using them to convey propaganda about the enemy.
He did not, for example, deny that they looted. Looting and war were, to Moroccans,
intertwined, but their capacity for theft was mentioned only to draw a comparison
with that of the ‘Reds’, Spanish or otherwise. As one Regular said to another, while they
discussed the subject of looting:
. . . esta´s ‘tonto´n’ de la cabeza. Nunca registres a los milicianos, a los de mono azul.
Esos pobretes no tienen ma´s que piojos. Tienes que elegir bien y cuando veas uno de
esos hombretones grandes y gordos, o un rubio de esos de cara redonda, busca bien
y encontrara´s billetes; ¡y de los grandes! Esos no se fı´an y lo llevan todo encima . . . los
milicianos no tienen ni una peseta; ¡entre los rusos y los franceses se lo llevan todo!
(Ruiz Albe´niz 1938a, p. 120)22
In a January 1937 article Ruiz Albe´niz told the story of Legionnaires and Moors who,
searching for food in the university city’s National Hygiene Institute, came across an
unexpected bounty: live rabbits, guinea pigs, chickens, and cats. All of these found
their way into the troops’ cooking pots, but, as it turned out, they had been inoculated
with typhus, plague, cholera, and other diseases. Not one of the soldiers fell ill:
‘¿Bacilitos a la Legio´n? ¿Vibrioncitos a los Regulares? Vamos, vamos, formalidad,
sen˜ores, ¡formalidad! Se trata de “hombres”, de verdaderos hombres, a los que,
afortunadamente, ¡no los parte ni un rayo!’ (Ruiz Albe´niz, 1938a, p. 147). Ruiz Albe´niz
described episodes of courage and of humour, with the Regulares fighting, resting, or
recuperating from their wounds in hospital.23 They were just another—albeit more
exotic—element of the Nationalist army; the task that they were participating in was so
obviously just that there was no need to account for their presence in Spain. One may
disagree with, or distrust, Ruiz Albe´niz, but here was one author who viewed the
Moors as individuals and who attempted to bring them to life for his audience; they
were ‘old friends’ with whom he always found time to drink tea in the front lines;
they were also an integral part of the Spanish army and not ‘foreign volunteers’
(Ruiz Albe´niz 1938c, pp. 51–52). While Republicans published stories of Moroccan
troops being paid in worthless pre-inflation German marks, or being about to rise in
revolt, and while the Popular Army’s political commissars were given instructions on
how to provoke desertions among the Moroccan troops facing them (El Comisario,
18 December 1936), Ruiz Albe´niz presented a completely different view—of men who
wanted to fight for Franco. This notion would be kept alive for years to come.24
The value of Ruiz Albe´niz’s wartime chronicles to Franco’s war machine is hard to
estimate; studies on Civil War propaganda tend to focus either on the Republican side
or on the more extreme elements within the Nationalist camp. But what is not
surprising is that in order to explain their actions, the africanista officers who led the
1936 coup should have had recourse to Ruiz Albe´niz, whom they viewed as one of their
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own. He had been defending their actions and pressing their claims for over two
decades, subsuming any political beliefs he might once have held into the task of
protecting Spain’s presence in North Africa. Now that these officers were striving for
power in Spain itself, driving out all of his old opponents, Ruiz Albe´niz could not but
lend his aid.
Notes
[1] For the most famous of all of these works, see Franco (1922).
[2] Sebastian Balfour calls him ‘a notable Arabist and a proponent, along with the mining
companies, of a neo-colonialist strategy of not interfering with the existing power balance in
the Rif ’ (2002, p.17).
[3] His real name was Yilaˆlıˆ Mohammad el-Yusfi el-Zerhuˆnıˆ.
[4] For all of his paternalism, and in spite of some extremely harsh verdicts, Ruiz Albe´niz’s attitude
towards the people of the Protectorate was at odds with that presented in countless military
accounts of the 1909 and subsequent military campaigns: ‘Se trata siempre del mismo
adversario, del “moro”, al que se considera todavı´a enemigo hereditario, “los crueles enemigos
de nuestra sangre”, con un resto de admiracio´n caballeresca hacia su coraje y bravura y espı´ritu
de independencia, aunque el homenaje al enemigo, que lo situ´a en un contexto histo´rico,
desaparece casi siempre bajo la avalancha de frases injuriosas para caracterizarlo, con lo que la
eliminacio´n del infrahombre ası´ descrito se convierte entonces en una obra de salubridad
nacional’ (Bachoud 1988, p.131).
[5] For a summary of Romanones’s view on the ideal policy towards Morocco, see Youssef Akmir,
‘Reflexiones sobre la sociedad marroquı´ precolonial’, in Jose´ U. Martı´nez Carreras (2000).
[6] There is an ample bibliography covering events at Annual. Some useful recent works are Juan
Pando (1999); Manuel Leguineche (1996); and C. R. Pennell (1986). The list of published
accounts of the battle is enormous, as was the polemical literature that it gave rise to in a shocked
Spain.
[7] The best account of Abdel Krim’s intentions is to be found in de Madariaga (2000, pp. 475-502).
[8] Balfour (2002) is easier on Silvestre, drawing attention to humanitarian, if paternalistic,
concerns for the welfare of the people of the Protectorate. In this he largely follows Pando
(1999). Leguineche (1996) is closer to Ruiz Albe´niz.
[9] Only the fear of non-Spanish European intervention restrained Abdel Krim. See Abdelmajid
Benjelloun (1988, p.78).
[10] ‘Ved un ejemplo. El que estas lı´neas escribe, vivio´ antes que ningu´n espan˜ol en el interior del Rif,
auxilio´ a nuestras columnas en la campan˜a del nueve con sus datos sobre el terreno . . . publico´
dos obras acerca de nuestra accio´n en el norte africano y del problema indı´gena e internacional;
como redactor de El Liberal y de Diario Universal ha escrito cerca de 600 artı´culos (aparte los de
la Guerra del Nueve) acerca de los problemas de Espan˜a en Africa, y de Espan˜a y Francia en
Marruecos. . .. Pues bien; todo este alarde (que a algunos parecera´ vanidoso y autobombı´stico),
toda esta labor, no merecio´ jama´s la menor atencio´n de los hombres polı´ticos y del gobierno de
Espan˜a’ (Ruiz Albe´niz 1921, p. 251).
[11] Mount Arruit was the scene of the greatest massacre of surrendering Spanish troops during the
campaign.
[12] In this surprising equation of Spaniards and Moroccans as racial equals Ruiz Albe´niz
was not alone. An extraordinary thesis was advanced by Jose´ Varela, Franco’s Minister of War
(1940, pp. 25-26). See also Juan Beigbeder’s words in Morocco in 1939: ‘Y ya que hablo de
cultura a´rabe, es evidente que Espan˜a, por donde pase, tiene que arabizar. Es algo que llevamos
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en la sangre: la cultura, la civilizacio´n y la arabizacio´n son para nosotros lo mismo’
(Discursos. . ., p. 8).
[13] In a praiseworthy review of a book by General Goded, Marruecos: etapas de la pacificacio´n
(1932), Ruiz Albe´niz claimed to have been arrested for writing against Primo’s policy of
withdrawal (Informaciones, 3 May 1932).
[14] Another pseudonym was Chispero, which Ruiz Albe´niz used when writing about Madrid life
and customs.
[15] What is most remarkable, of course, is that the Republic was viewed by the Moroccans as a great
disappointment, precisely because it continuously frustrated their aspirations (Miguel Martı´n
1973, pp. 106-143). Mohammad Ibn Azzuz Hakimwrites, after charting the Republic’s action in
Morocco, that one of the reasons why the army chose Morocco for its rising was ‘el tener la
certeza de que el pueblo marroquı´ no se pondrı´a del lado republicano, dado el descontento
general que existı´a contra la nefasta polı´tica marroquı´ de la Repu´blica’ (Hakim 1997, p. 23).
[16] According to Ruiz Albe´niz, rumours in the French Zone concerning the internationalization of
the Spanish zone were extremely harmful. Many French blamed Spain for the spread of
communism in Morocco, but the truth was quite different: the leading ‘troublemakers’ came
from either the French zone or Algeria. Cooperation between France and Spain, rather than
mutual recriminations, was vital (Informaciones, 18 May 1931).
[17] For details on the emergence of nationalism in the Spanish Protectorate, see John P. Halstead
(1968), and Benjelloun (1988).
[18] Ruiz Albe´niz would later repeat the theme of the lecture, providing additional figures
(Informaciones, 3 December 1931).
[19] Ruiz Albe´niz had already outlined a plan to ensure that deserving soldiers would be allowed to
serve the state, and be protected by it, during their lifetime. His central concern was to make
sure volunteer soldiers would go on to serve in Spain’s various police forces, described by the
Minister of the Interior as a ‘counter-revolutionary army’ (Informaciones, 12 February 1935).
[20] For a comparison, see Ian Gibson (1986).
[21] See also the comments of French General Jouart: ‘De`s son bapte`me du feu devant Melilla, en
1912, il s’affirma d’un courage exemplaire devenu vite le´gendaire parmi ses Regulares et son
tercio qui l’adorent, et dans tout le Maroc ou` il est ve´ne´re´’ (Jouart 1938, p. 14).
[22] In a radio broadcast made in December 1936, Ruiz Albe´niz claimed that one skilful Regular, in his
examination of Republicans killed in battle, had found 11,000 duros (Ruiz Albe´niz 1938a, p.123).
[23] See Ruiz Albe´niz’s description of the relationship between woundedMoors in a military hospital
and their favourite nurse, Carmen: ‘A Carmen la hacen comer con ellos una manzana. Y luego,
muy despacio, esconden su “Lalla [saint] Carmen” [her photograph] entre los pliegues de su
chilaba. Miran en silencio, con mirada infinitamente nin˜a, pura, la blancura de su tez, la negrura
de sus ojos, y . . . con una uncio´n mı´stica, de inefable devocio´n del alma, tocan con sus dedazos
rudos la frente de la nin˜a, y los dedos van a perfumar sus labios con un beso de infinita gratitud.
Y ya sumisos como corderos, a todos diciendo adioses cordiales, se alejan diciendo: – Estar
hermanos, estar hermanos. Espan˜ol y moro, ¡¡kif, kif!!’ (Ruiz Albe´niz 1938b, p. 159).
[24] See, for example, Discursos pronunciados por el Alto Comisario de Espan˜a en Marruecos, Coronel
Beigbeder, y por el eminente filo´sofo libane´s Prof. Amin Er-Rihani (1939).
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